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Immigration-related speechmaking in a party-constrained parliament: 
evidence from the ‘refugee crisis’ of the 18th German Bundestag 
(2013-2017) 
The 18th Bundestag term was marked by a high salience of the refugee and 
asylum issue dominating the political agenda. Taking this context as a case study, 
this paper asks which factors make legislators talk about immigration on the 
parliamentary floor. Three different literatures provide different answers to this 
question. A first literature highlights that immigrant-origin legislators with a 
visible background may have intrinsic motives to talk about immigration. A 
second literature raises attention to legislators’ personal vote-seeking incentives 
to talk about immigration when the issue is electorally decisive. Contrary to these 
first two literatures, a third literature posits that legislative debates do not provide 
legislators the leeway to follow individual motives on the parliamentary floor, but 
that parliamentary party groups (PPGs) control access to the parliamentary floor 
and thus follow own strategies when allocating floor time to speak about the 
immigration issue. To examine this puzzle of competing expectations, a corpus of 
more than 10,000 speeches is leveraged, utilising a structural topic model, a 
novel method of quantitative text analysis. Results suggest that legislators’ 
speech attention to the refugee and asylum issue in the 18th Bundestag was 
mainly shaped by PPG specific factors rather than by their individual motives. 
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Introduction 
Over the past few decades, immigration has become a highly salient and electorally 
decisive policy issue in a number of Western European democracies (Green-Pedersen 
and Otjes 2017). Investigating political attention to the immigration issue is therefore a 
fundamental topic in contemporary European political science. Our understanding of the 
phenomenon has benefited from a number of recent contributions analysing the 
determinants of issue attention to immigration in party manifestos (Kortmann and 
Stecker 2017; Ruedin and Morales 2017; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017). Less is 
known, by contrast, about the politics of immigration-related speechmaking (but see 
Blätte and Wüst 2017). However, as speeches on the floor provide legislators and their 
parties a publicly exposed stage to communicate issue priorities and policy positions, 
they are important tools of political communication and representation (Proksch and 
Slapin 2015; Bäck and Debus 2016; Bächtiger 2014). By drawing attention to certain 
policy issues while deemphasising others in their speeches, representatives can publicly 
demonstrate that they are responsive to current problem pressures and voters’ issue 
priorities (Budge and Farlie 1983; Spoon and Klüver 2014; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 
2017). This raises the question of why some legislators draw attention to immigration in 
their speeches while others do not, despite the overall growing salience of the issue. 
The present article pursues this question by focussing on the 18th German 
Bundestag (2013-17), a legislative term during which the issue of refugees and asylum 
became a hot topic in the course of the European refugee crisis. Taking this term as a 
crucial case study, this article attempts to contrast individual with collective 
explanations of legislative behaviour. Two literatures raise attention to individual 
motives as potential drivers of speechmaking. First, intrinsic motives flowing from the 
personal experiences of legislators who themselves or whose parents have a migratory 
history may lead to more speech attention to the issue of refugees and asylum as 
compared to other legislators (Searing 1994; Searing 1991; Wüst 2014a; Saalfeld and 
Bischof 2013; Saalfeld 2011; Blätte and Wüst 2017).  A second literature argues that, 
depending on their individual re-election contexts, legislators have extrinsic motives to 
talk about policy issues that dominate the political agenda (Mayhew 1974; Carey and 
Shugart 1995; Carey 2009; Zittel and Gschwend 2008; André, Depauw, and Martin 
2015).  
However, insofar as parliamentary democracies are analysed, we need to be 
careful not to underestimate the role of collective parliamentary party groups (PPGs) in 
legislative speechmaking. In this regard, a third literature casts doubts as to whether 
speeches on the floor provide legislators the necessary leeway to express individual 
concerns when highly salient policy issues are debated. In a nutshell, the argument is 
that in most parliaments PPG leaderships control not just the plenary thematic agenda 
but decide also who speaks about which topic (Proksch and Slapin 2015; Bäck, Debus, 
and Müller 2014; Bäck and Debus 2018; Bäck and Debus 2016; Cox 2006). Therefore, 
legislators may be often constrained in following individual motives, but are rather 
forced to follow collective motives on the parliamentary floor, regardless of whether 
they are, as individuals, intrinsically or extrinsically motivated.  
Empirically, the study is based on a novel dataset containing over 10,000 
legislative speeches held in the 18th Bundestag. To measure speech attention to the 
refugee and asylum issue, it utilises a new method of quantitative text analysis: 
structural topic models (STM) (Roberts et al. 2014). Results indicate that during the 
most recent German immigration shock, PPGs’ organisational capacities and their roles 
as gatekeepers to the parliamentary floor were far stronger determinants of such 
speechmaking than legislators’ individual motives.   
What makes legislators take the parliamentary floor to speak about 
immigration?  
Before the theoretical framework is presented, it is necessary to clarify what 
immigration-related speechmaking means conceptually for this study. Importantly, this 
paper is not about the question of representing the interests of long-term citizens of 
immigrant-origin with full voting rights. Rather, it is about speech attention to the issue 
of refugees and asylum, referring to a group of people who are widely considered to 
remain in Germany only for a limited period of time and who, as non-citizens, have no 
opportunity to partake in the electoral process. Put differently, immigrants and 
specifically refugees and asylum seekers are conceptualised in this study to be the 
content of political representation, rather than a social group meant to be politically 
represented. To be sure, many immigrant-origin citizens may have a specific interest in 
migration-related issues, including the issue of refugees and asylum. Thus, scholars 
often look for migration-related content in parliamentary behaviour when examining 
questions of the substantive representation of immigrant-origin citizens (Blätte and 
Wüst 2017; Wüst 2014a; Saalfeld and Bischof 2013; Saalfeld 2011). However, 
migration-related policy preferences may differ across different groups of immigrant-
origin citizens (Heath et al. 2013, chap. 4). In Germany, for example, Goerres and co-
authors show that the group of so-called ‘ethnic’ Germans expressed to a large extent 
sceptical stances regarding the influx of refugees and asylum seekers during the 2017 
Bundestag election campaign (Goerres, Mayer, and Spies 2018). Therefore, although 
there may be some overlap between immigrant-origin citizens’ interests and attention to 
the issue of refugee and asylum, it is nevertheless instrumental to refer to these as two 
different dimensions of immigration politics, with the latter being the focus of this 
study. 
Legislators’ immigrant backgrounds and speech attention to immigration 
The first individual factor considered to affect legislative speechmaking relates to 
legislators’ intrinsic motives shaped by their personal backgrounds. ‘Motivational’ 
parliamentary role theory  assumes that legislators are purposive actors who pursue their 
exogenously (career-related) and endogenously (emotionally) conditioned individual 
goals in parliament (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012, 21–27; Searing 1991). Unless they 
have the institutional responsibility to fulfil a ‘leadership role’ like whip, legislators are 
thought to be relatively free to choose from different pre-defined ‘preference roles’ 
(Searing 1991, 1249–50). Among those are ‘policy advocates’ who mainly seek to 
influence government policy, ‘constituency members’ who choose to concentrate their 
legislative activities on redressing grievances of constituents, ‘parliament men’ who 
monitor the institutional structures ,and ‘ministerial aspirants’ who seek promotion to 
the government ranks (Searing 1994, 16; Searing 1991, 1253). While such roles may be 
chosen by legislators depending on situational contexts (Blomgren and Rozenberg 2012, 
9), any of these, however, allow for considerable scope to translate intrinsic motives 
into actual legislative behaviour (Searing 1991, 1253). As Searing notes, ‘(e)motional 
incentives are the principal energizing forces in all parliamentary roles’ (Searing 1994, 
19).  Plausibly, intrinsic motives are shaped to an extent by social group membership 
and the personal experiences legislators have had during their life, which may make 
them ‘refer, consciously or unconsciously, to their biography when developing their 
preferences’ (Bäck and Debus 2016, 34; Bäck, Debus, and Müller 2014, 507).  
With regard to immigration-related legislative behaviour, attention is often 
raised to legislators’ own migratory backgrounds (Wüst 2014a; Saalfeld and Bischof 
2013; Blätte and Wüst 2017; Saalfeld 2011). The assumption is that experiences of 
migration and the obstacles of integrating oneself into society create a special awareness 
of, and interest in, the challenges and problems of the ‘Einwanderungsgesellschaft’. 
Especially immigrant-origin politicians with visible traits, such as foreign-sounding 
names and/or non-Caucasian appearance, may have been constantly reminded in their 
lives to be ‘distinct’ from the majority society, creating an intrinsic motivation or, in 
Searing words, ‘emotional incentive’ to focus their parliamentary activities on 
immigration-related issues. Indeed, a number of empirical studies, for example in 
Germany (Blätte and Wüst 2017; Wüst 2014a) and in the UK (Saalfeld and Bischof 
2013; Saalfeld 2011), suggest that immigrant-origin legislators focus more strongly on 
migration-specific issues, especially those with a ‘visible’ background.   
Based on the reviewed theoretical and empirical literature, visible immigrant-
origin legislators may be thus more intrinsically motivated to speak about the refugee 
and asylum issue than other legislators. 
Legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote and speech attention to 
immigration 
A second literature adheres to the logic of principal-agent theory, according to which 
legislators are assumed to act as agents who are electorally accountable to voters, thus 
responding to the demands of this principal, providing for a vertical representation link 
between ruled and rulers (Mitchell 2000; Carey 2009). Re-election is assumed to be the 
central motivation for legislators’ responsiveness to voters, because re-election is a 
necessary precondition for any other career-related goal, whether policy influence or 
prestigious offices in parliament (Strøm 1997). Thus, if their re-election is uncertain, 
legislators may use their legislative repertoire to take positions, claim credit and/or 
advertise their personal qualities for the purpose of attracting personal votes (Mayhew 
1974).  
Aligning their own issue priorities with those of voters is intimately related to 
legislators’ personal vote-seeking strategies. Indeed, commonly considered an important 
feature of (collective) party responsiveness (Budge and Farlie 1983; Spoon and Klüver 
2014; Green-Pedersen and Otjes 2017), issue attention considerations should also rank 
high in legislators’ individual strategies to cater to voters. Similarly to the argument that 
parties have vote-seeking incentives to align own issue priorities with that of voters 
(Spoon and Klüver 2014), legislators should seek to prioritise issues that are important 
to voters as an expression of catering to their political demands. Taking policy positions 
presumes that political actors dedicate a minimum of attention to the policy issue on 
which positions are taken (Budge and Farlie 1983). Why would a voter feel attracted to 
a legislator who takes a similar policy position on an issue but who does not 
convincingly show that s/he considers the issue important? Therefore, individual 
legislators seeking personal votes should see reasons to align their own issue priorities 
with that of their voters. If the refugee and asylum issue becomes more salient on the 
general political agenda and in the minds of voters, individual legislators may thus seek 
to increase attention to this issue in their speeches as well.  
Commonly, legislators’ personal vote-seeking incentives are said to be shaped 
by the way electoral rules transfer votes into seats (Carey and Shugart 1995; Carey 
2009; Mitchell 2000). Only under electoral rules which provide voters the possibility to 
influence directly the electoral fate of individual legislators, for example under 
conditions of single-member plurality elections (SMD) rather than under conditions of 
closed-list proportional representation (PR), should legislative behaviour be tailored to 
appeal to local voters (Carey and Shugart 1995; Mitchell 2000). Conversely, under 
conditions of closed-list PR in districts of high magnitude, voters are typically provided 
with long lists of candidates, which they can only approve or defect as a whole. Here, 
legislators’ electoral fate depends mainly on the list position allocated by their parties, 
such that they have fewer incentives to cultivate a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 
1995; Carey 2009). Therefore, legislators should have stronger incentives to align their 
own issue priorities with that of voters under SMD, while closed-list PR should provide 
stronger incentives to be loyal to the party. 
However, recent scholarship suggests that the effect of electoral rules is not 
universal in the sense that all legislators face the same personal vote-seeking incentives 
just because they are elected under the same set of electoral rules. These works take into 
account that the personal vote-seeking behaviour of legislators elected in SMDs are 
conditional on their individual levels of electoral vulnerability (Zittel and Gschwend 
2008; André, Depauw, and Martin 2015). When SMD legislators’ districts are ‘safe’ 
seats, because they won it in the previous election with a comfortable vote margin, they 
may not be too concerned about reaching their re-election goals, attenuating their 
personal vote-seeking incentives. Conversely, if the previous constituency election was 
a close race, they should be more concerned about potential vote losses, which should 
create stronger incentives to align their own issue attention to that of voters.    
The constraining influence of parliamentary party groups on individual 
speechmaking 
The two theoretical perspectives outlined so far share the assumption that legislators’ 
individual motives are underlying their speech attention to the refugee and asylum issue. 
However, relying on this assumption disregards that PPGs are important contexts for 
legislative behaviour in general, and for speechmaking in particular.  
As Cox (Cox 2006, 142–49) puts it, PPGs are essential to parliamentary 
decision-making, because they help solving the problem of a ‘plenary bottleneck’. That 
is, without hierarchically organised PPGs controlling the plenary agenda and thus 
creating inequalities in legislators’ access to the plenary, it would be impossible to 
coordinate which subset of all proposed bills can make it through the bottleneck, given 
the hard budget constraint on time and the fact that each individual member has motive 
to consume plenary time. As rulers over the parliamentary floor, PPG leaders may be 
thus conceptualised as utilising legislators as a resource to reach two types of party 
goals, that is, policy and votes (Müller 2000). Therefore, we may refer here again to the 
principal-agent conception, describing a vertical hierarchical link between PPG leaders 
and legislators, with the latter supposed to act upon the instructions of the former. 
First, in order to reach their policy-seeking goals, PPG leaders must take into 
account that policy-making takes place in various (sub-) policy areas. Therefore, an 
internal division of labour is a necessary feature of PPGs, whereby legislators are 
supposed to serve their PPGs as experts in different (sub-) policy areas. Policy-
specialised committee structures help PPGs ensuring such horizontal coordination 
(Saalfeld and Strøm 2014). Moreover, due to the tight vertical organisation of PPGs in 
most parliamentary democracies, vertical and horizontal coordination interact. That is, 
the vertical grip of PPG leaders over legislators reach down into their horizontally 
differentiated policy/committee specialisation (Damgaard 1995). Thus, PPG leaders 
should be more likely to delegate plenary time to legislators on topics that fall into the 
area of their policy specialisation. 
Arguably, when choosing legislators to become policy experts in certain policy 
areas/committees, it should make sense for PPGs to take into account their personal 
skills and experiences. As immigrant-origin legislators have often distinct experiences 
of immigration and societal and cultural integration, they may be more likely to be 
perceived by PPG leaderships as experts on immigration. Moreover, if their immigrant 
background is visible, parties can utilise this trait for signalling expertise on the 
parliamentary floor to voters. This bias is also suggested by Nergiz’ (2014) interview-
based qualitative research on immigrant-origin legislators in Germany. Assigning 
immigrant-origin legislators for expert positions on migration is supposed to create an 
impression of what Nergiz dubs ‘authenticity’. As one interviewee puts is: ‘(i)t is 
important how well spokespersons can present the message of our party, regardless of 
whether the person has migratory experience or not. […] However, when people see a 
migrant-origin person, then it is more convincing – people realise that I know what I am 
talking about’ (Nergiz 2014, 255). Thus, an alternative explanation for the finding that 
legislators with a visible immigrant background are more likely to talk about migrant-
related issues in the plenary may be their ascribed policy expertise on that matter, 
serving the need for a distinct division of labour within PPGs. It follows that, if policy 
specialisation is the driving mechanism, immigrant-origin legislators with a visible 
background should talk more about the refugee and asylum issue than other legislators, 
conditional on their assignment to committees more likely to deal with matters of 
immigration and integration policy. 
In addition to that, it can be argued that the impact of visible immigrant-origin 
legislators should be further conditional on the size of their PPGs. The intuition is that 
larger PPGs provide better conditions for an efficient division of labour. To the 
contrary, in smaller PPGs there is less personnel available to be assigned to an equally 
large number of (sub-)policy areas. This challenge is reflected in legislators’ 
membership in policy-specialised committees. In Germany, for example, legislators 
from larger PPGs can normally concentrate on one committee membership, while 
legislators from smaller PPGs have to split their parliamentary work across several 
committees (Ismayr 2012, 168; Ismayr 1992, 189–91). Since legislators in smaller PPGs 
are supposed to develop an expertise in more areas than legislators in larger PPGs, 
legislators’ individual areas of expertise are more diverse and are thus more blurred 
across legislators in smaller PPGs, while they are more distinct and delineated in larger 
PPGs. Accordingly, legislators from larger PPGs may speak overall about fewer issue 
areas on the parliamentary floor, while the lack of personnel in smaller PPGs makes it 
necessary that legislators have to speak not just about one, but about several issues, 
blurring the issue areas which they focus upon in their speeches altogether. Therefore, 
differences in speech attention to immigration between visible immigrant-origin and 
other legislators should be less pronounced in smaller than in larger PPGs.  
Second, speeches provide parties a public platform to communicate their policy 
positions, to claim credit and to advertise the party label as an electoral strategy to 
attract voters (Bächtiger 2014). For this purpose, PPG leaders should value a unified 
party message, which they should seek to protect from deviant behaviour of legislators 
from within their own ranks (Proksch and Slapin 2015; Bäck and Debus 2018; Bäck and 
Debus 2016). Proksch and Slapin describe the potentially tense relationship between 
PPG leaders and legislators in a formal model of a delegation game (Proksch and Slapin 
2015). The extent to which PPG leaders place importance on a unified party position 
depends in this model on the extent to which the electoral system provides for party-
based voting cues. Where legislators’ individual reputation is an important source for 
gaining seats, for example in the British SMD system, PPG leaderships are more at ease 
with legislators deviating from the party line in their speeches. To the contrary, in 
closed-list PR systems, where citizens cast votes for a party label rather than for 
individual candidates, PPGs should try to circumvent deviant voices from within their 
own ranks. Similarly, in political systems like the German mixed-member proportional 
(MMP) system, where party-based voting cues are of utmost importance to parties’ 
electoral performance, PPG leaderships have strong incentives to maintain control over 
who speaks about what.  
Therefore, under MMP rules, PPG leaderships should seek to deny legislator 
access to the parliamentary floor if these follow own personal vote-seeking strategies 
(see also Bäck and Debus 2018). Especially if debates are about salient issues that have 
the potential to damage the party label, PPG leaders should be wary of this type of 
legislator. For this reason, contrary to the expectation made in the previous subchapter, 
SMD legislators from marginal seats may speak less, and not more, about such issues in 
their speeches than SMD legislators from ‘safe’ seats. 
Empirical context and hypotheses 
To examine this theoretical framework empirically, the present study focuses on the 
18th German Bundestag for a number of reasons. First, the number of legislators of 
immigrant-origin has steadily grown over the past two decades, reaching an 
unprecedented high in the 18th Bundestag, in which 37 immigrant-origin legislators 
were elected, making up for 5.9% of the entire parliament (Wüst 2014b).  
Second, Germany employs an MMP system, which provides for within-country 
variation of electoral rules. There are 299 MPs elected in SMDs and a slightly larger 
number of MPs elected in 16 multi-member districts under closed-list PR. However, 
since mainly the two largest parties, the Christian and the Social Democrats, have 
realistic chances of winning SMD seats, almost all SMD legislators are affiliated with 
these two parties. The electoral system is further compensatory, such that parties’ 
overall seat shares are determined by their vote shares in the PR tier (Saalfeld 2005). 
Therefore, while (government) legislators elected in SMDs should desire re-election in 
local constituencies, PPG leaderships should be mainly interested in maximising their 
PR votes (Proksch and Slapin 2015). 
Third, the Bundestag is a paradigmatic case of a party-controlled 
Arbeitsparlament (‘working parliament’), based on hierarchically organised PPGs 
cutting across a system of policy-specialised committees, ensuring a strongly party-
controlled division of labour among legislators (Miller and Stecker 2008). Since it is in 
the discretion of PPG leaderships to assign and withdraw legislators to committees, they 
decide implicitly which policy areas legislators specialise in (Miller and Stecker 2008; 
Damgaard 1995). As policy experts, legislators are supposed to represent the official 
position of the party, enforced by the thread of sanctions from the PPG leadership, 
which range from subtle persuasion and threats, to the withdrawal of the committee 
seat, to the ultimate denial of upward promotion within the hierarchy of the PPG (Miller 
and Stecker 2008; Ismayr 2012, 169). Similarly, PPG leaderships control access to the 
parliamentary floor in the Bundestag. Ismayr describes the process of speaker selection 
in the German Bundestag as being decided by chairpersons of PPGs’ working groups 
who are also members of the PPG leadership (Ismayr, 2012, p. 305).  
Fourth, the political context of the 18th Bundestag was one of a serious 
immigration shock, which has turned the issue of refugees and asylum into a hot one of 
German politics. Since 2013, immigration to Germany has steadily increased until late 
2015. Official numbers report an influx of overall 1.1, 1.3 and 2 million immigrants in 
2013, 2014 and 2015 respectively. The peak in 2015 was fuelled by an estimated influx 
of 890,000 asylum seekers, mainly in the second half-year (Bundesamt für Migration 
und Flüchtlinge 2016). This immigration shock has also been a consequence of the 
federal government’s decision to suspend the Dublin Agreement in 2015, a decision that 
opened the border for a high number of refugees, who were stuck in Budapest/Hungary 
hoping to continue their journey mainly from war-torn Syria to Germany and other 
Northern and Western European Countries.  
(Figure 1 near here) 
Given the huge logistic, administrative and, indeed, political challenges that the 
intake of such high numbers of immigrants caused, nationwide opinion polls testified 
soon that the issue of immigration, asylum and the integration of refugees became the 
‘most important political problem’ for German citizens, as shown in Figure 1. The 
figure shows data from the Politbarometer, a monthly repeated opinion survey, which 
asks in open-ended questions what respondents consider the most important current 
problem (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2018). The graph relates to the percentage of 
respondents referring to immigration in their answers between 2000 and 2018. As seen, 
the percentage of respondents doing so increased steadily since 2013 to reach a high of 
almost 90% in the second half of 2015. Taking advantage of the increased saliency of 
the refugee and asylum issue, a new right-wing populist party, the ‘Alternative für 
Deutschland’ (AfD), entered the electoral stage to capitalise on votes by the use of anti-
immigrant rhetoric and position taking. Consequently, due to the high salience of the 
immigration issue the AfD posed an electoral threat to the established parties, in 
particular to the government parties responsible for immigration policy, the Social 
Democrats (SPD) and the two Christian Democratic sister parties (CDU/CSU).  
Against the political and institutional context of the 18th Bundestag, and based 
on the theoretical framework outlined in the theory section, two sets of competing 
hypotheses are derived.  
First, the context of the sudden refugee crisis of the 18th Bundestag provides for 
a critical test of a direct effect of intrinsic motives encoded in the visibility of 
immigrant-origin legislators on immigration-related speechmaking. Consequently, a 
first hypothesis reads that visible legislators of immigrant-origin were more likely to 
speak about the refugee and asylum issue than other legislators (H1). Alternatively, two 
competing hypotheses aim at testing whether these legislators talk more about the issue, 
because they are more likely to be selected as policy experts serving the need for an 
efficient division of labour within their PPGs rather than out of intrinsic motives. As 
policy expertise can be plausibly assumed to be reflected in legislators’ committee 
memberships to a certain extent, visible immigrant-origin legislators should be more 
likely to speak about immigration issues as policy experts, if they sit on committees that 
are more likely to deal with immigration-related issues (for example the social affairs 
and interior committee rather than the environment or defence committee). Thus, a first 
competing hypothesis is that the positive effect of visible legislators of immigrant-
minority origin on speech attention to the refugee and asylum issue is mainly driven by 
their assignment to immigration-related committees (H2.1). 
Additionally, if policy expertise ascribed by the PPG leadership is the driving 
mechanism, the organisational capacities of the PPG should condition the extent to 
which visible immigrant-origin legislators have a stronger focus on immigration issues 
than other legislators. Since conditions for an efficient division of labour are better in 
larger than in smaller PPGs, legislators’ policy specialisations tend to be more blurred 
in smaller PPGs, as described the previous section. In the 18th Bundestag, the 
CDU/CSU and the SPD provide for cases of larger PPGs (311 and 192 seats 
respectively), and the Greens and the Left for cases of smaller PPGs (63 and 64 seats 
respectively). This provides for a test of yet another hypothesis competing with H1: 
legislators of immigrant-minority origin speak more about the refugee and asylum issue 
than other legislators, conditional on the size of their PPGs (H2.2). 
The second set of competing hypotheses contrasts individual against collective 
electoral motives. On one hand, with the refugee and asylum issue dominating the 
political agenda, SMD legislators should have had incentives to raise attention to this 
issue in their speeches to align their own issue attention with that of voters. However, 
this incentive should become stronger as a function of their individual level of electoral 
vulnerability. A third hypothesis is thus that SMD legislators were more likely to speak 
about the refugee and asylum issue the higher their electoral vulnerability (H3). 
On the other, as the refugee crisis posed a serious electoral threat to the two 
government parties (SPD and CDU/CSU), which were increasingly under siege against 
the general perception that the government was not able to handle the crisis, further 
fuelled by the tireless attacks of the AfD criticising the government’s immigration 
policy, the PPG leaderships of the CDU/CSU and SPD should have had strong 
incentives to ‘close their own ranks’ in order to protect the party label from taking 
further damage. Thus, PPG leaders of the government parties should have been 
especially wary of providing access to debates on immigration to legislators who 
followed own electoral strategies in relation to the the refugee and asylum issue. 
Consequently, a fourth hypothesis reads that SMD legislators were less likely to speak 
about the refugee and asylum issue in the 18th Bundestag the higher their electoral 
vulnerability (H4). 
Data and methods 
In order to examine these hypotheses, this study relies on a dataset containing a corpus 
of all oral contributions in the plenary during the 18th German Bundestag. The data is 
provided by OffenesParlament.de, an NGO website committed to making parliamentary 
processes transparent (OffenesParlament.de 2018). Additionally, a second dataset was 
collected containing legislator-level variables to be described in due course. Since both 
datasets contain information on the same legislators, it was possible to merge the two 
into one dataset. 
Using structural topic models to measure speech attention to immigration 
In order to measure speech attention to the issue of immigration, this paper relies on a 
recently developed automated method for textual analysis: structural topic models 
(STM) (Roberts et al. 2014). STM belongs to the family of unsupervised ‘topic models’, 
which rely on clustering algorithms to code a collection of texts (a corpus) into several 
topics based on patterns of word co-occurrence in the texts (Grimmer and Stewart 
2013). For the purpose of this paper, the assumption is that these topics can be 
interpreted as latent issue attention of speeches. For technical details, a description of 
the text pre-processing as well as additional validation analyses, please see section A1 
in the online appendix. 
 
 
Based on an STM with k=13 topics, Table 1 gives an overview over the six most 
discriminating terms in each topic, so-called FREX terms, that is, words which are 
highly likely to appear in a topic (frequent) while also being less likely to appear in 
other topics (exclusive) (Roberts et al. 2014). The first topic clearly identifies speech 
attention to immigration with a strong bias towards refugee and asylum issues, indicated 
by the most discriminating words ‘flüchtlingen’ (refugees), ‘flüchtling’ (refugee), 
‘asylbewerb’ (asylum seeker),  ‘integr’ (integration), ‘asyl’ (asylum) and ‘migrat’ 
(migration).  
 (Table 1 near here) 
Although it cannot completely be ruled out that other aspects of immigration 
politics may be covered to some extent in the topic, validation analyses presented in the 
appendix section A1 provide evidence that the found immigration topic corresponds 
mainly to the refugee and asylum issue. This interpretation is further substantiated by an 
assessment of what Grimmer and Stewart dub the ‘predictive validity’ of a topic, that is, 
an assessment of how well variation in topic usage corresponds over time with expected 
events (Grimmer and Stewart 2013) . For this purpose, Figure 2 visualises how the 
temporal development of the immigration topic in the 18th Bundestag (2013-2017) 
corresponds to the issue attention of citizens expressed in the ‘most important problem’ 
question of the monthly waves of the Politbarometer survey (Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen 2018), already utilised in Figure 1. As seen, not only peaked citizens’ issue 
attention at the climax of the European refugee crisis in the second half of 2015, but 
also the found topic as measured by the k=13 STM (with 95% confidence intervals).  
(Figure 2 near here) 
Dataset 
While the dependent variable, speech attention to the refugee and asylum issue, is 
measured at the level of 10,379 speeches utilising the k=13 STM, a number of 
legislator-specific variables extend the dataset further. Descriptive statistics of all 
variables are shown in section A2 of the appendix file.  
Main independent variables include the following. Visible immigrant-origin 
legislator takes a value of one if a speech is given by such a legislator, and zero 
otherwise. This group of legislators is defined and coded according to two criterions. 
First, the criterion immigrant-origin applies to all legislators born either (a) abroad or in 
Germany with foreign nationality at birth, or (b) born with German nationality and at 
least one parent of foreign nationality at birth. In coding practice, however, Wüst’s 
(2014b) list of 37 immigrant-origin legislators was taken as a point for departure. 
Second these legislators were coded based on whether or not they have visible traits that 
make them objectively identifiable as having an immigrant background. Although 
defining oneself as belonging to an immigrant minority group is essentially a question 
of subjective self-perception, in practice, however, it is often unfeasible for social 
researchers to capture this subjectivity (Blätte and Wüst 2017, 210–11; Heath et al. 
2013, 15–17). For this reason, scholars commonly rely on objective concepts, such as 
the Canadian definition of visible minorities, which can be applied to immigrant-origin 
legislators who are identifiable as ‘non-Caucasian or non-white’ (Wüst 2014a, 102; 
Heath et al. 2013, 17). However, since the present paper has a central interest in the 
immigration expertise and/or signalling purpose of immigrant-origin legislators ascribed 
by PPG leaderships (i.e. the ‘authenticity’ of the spokesperson [Nergiz 2014, 254]), 
visibility refers here also to immigrant backgrounds that can be objectively inferred 
from the name of the speaker.  
Moreover, a set of dummy variables distinguishes speakers’ PPG affiliations. 
Migration-related committee is a dichotomous variable measuring whether speech 
givers sit on committees more likely to deal with immigration based on a modified 
categorisation scheme proposed by Wüst (Wüst 2011)1. Election mode distinguishes 
whether a speaker was elected from a party list (=0) or in an SMD (=1). In addition, 
vote margin measures the difference in votes between the SMD winner and the second 
best loser in the SMD race, in which the speaker was running as a candidate in the 2013 
Bundestag election. Since most list legislators ran as double candidates in party lists and 
in SMDs simultaneously, this variable takes also values for most list legislators except 
those who did not run in an SMD race simultaneously.  
  
A set of control variables is supposed to account for other variation influencing 
speech attention to immigration. To account for the dynamic evolution of the refugee 
and asylum issue over time, days till election measures the date of a speech in days until 
the 2017 election. By including also the squared term of days till election, it is intended 
to better control for non-linear effects of time. Megaseat distinguishes backbencher 
legislators from those who occupy a parliamentary position of influence, defined as 
committee chairs and members of the PPG leaderships including the chairpersons of 
working groups. Seniority approximates the career stage by counting the years 
legislators have been serving in the Bundestag prior to the 2013 election. Female takes 
values of one for female legislators and zero otherwise. Moreover, key 
sociodemographic features at the SMD level are accounted for, with the local foreigner 
share, the population share of residents older than 60 and the unemployment rate. And 
finally, East is a dichotomous variable distinguishing legislators elected in the territory 
of the former GDR, to account for the fact that the Eastern German population was, on 
average, more critical of the governments’ immigration policy than the rest of the 
German population, indicated by a higher support for the AfD and frequent anti-
immigrant protests (PEGIDA). 
Analysing speech attention to immigration in the 18th Bundestag 
Table 3 presents the results of fractional response logit models estimating speech 
attention to immigration in the 18th Bundestag. Fractional response models are 
appropriate here because the dependent variable is bound to the zero-one interval. 
Under such conditions, standard OLS regression models cannot guarantee that the 
predicted values of the dependent variable are restricted to the unit interval and would 
thus yield biased predictions for extreme values of the independent variables (Papke and 
Wooldridge 1996).2 The regression models take speeches as the units of analysis, 
estimating robust standard errors clustered at the level of legislators to account for the 
fact that speeches delivered by the same legislator are interdependent.   
 (Table 3 near here) 
 Models 1 to 3 are supposed to evaluate the first set of competing hypotheses, 
that is, whether visible immigrant-origin legislators are universally more likely to speak 
about immigration, or whether this effect is conditional on their committee 
specialisation and the size of their PPGs. While Model 1 estimates the effects of the 
independent variables without any interactions, Model 2 includes an interaction between 
these  legislators and migration-related committee. Model 3 includes the interaction 
with the party variable.   
 (Figure 3 near here) 
Model 1 suggests a positive and statistically significant effect of visible 
immigrant-origin legislators. However, Models 2 and 3 suggest that this effect is 
strongly dependent on legislators’ committee specialisation and on PPG size. Figure 3 
visualises these findings in the form of predicted immigration topic proportions with 
95% confidence intervals. The left-hand panel is based on Model 2 and shows that both 
types of legislators are significantly more likely to speak about immigration when they 
sit on migration-related committees. Although visible immigrant-origin legislators who 
sit on migration-related committees are estimated to talk slightly more about 
immigration than other legislators who also sit on such committees, this difference is 
not statistical significant. This is, in line with hypothesis 2.1, first evidence that 
legislators’ policy specialisation drives speech attention to immigration more strongly 
than immigrant-origin legislators’ intrinsic motives.  
The right-hand panel of Figure 3 corroborates this interpretation with additional 
empirical evidence. Based on the interaction of Model 3, the figure shows how speech 
attention to immigration varies depending on the visible immigrant-origin status of 
legislators and the size of their PPGs . As seen, in the two larger PPGs (CDU/CSU and 
SPD), which should allow for a more efficient division of labour, visible immigrant-
origin legislators are estimated to talk significantly more about immigration than their 
PPG colleagues do. By contrast, the difference between the two types of legislators in 
the two smaller PPGs (Greens and The Left) is not only substantially negligible, but the 
wide overlap of confidence intervals suggests that their estimated speech attention to 
immigration is also statistically indistinguishable, as suspected by hypothesis 2.2. Taken 
together, these results support hypotheses 2.1 and 2.2 rather than hypothesis 1.  
Models 4 and 5 engage with the second set of competing hypotheses, which 
dispute over whether SMD legislators should talk more or less about immigration as 
their individual level of electoral vulnerability increases. Model 4 and 5 extend Model 1 
by variables measured at the SMD level. As this kind of information can only be 
assigned to legislators who ran as SMD candidates in the 2013 election, missing values 
apply to 479 speeches delivered by PR legislators who did not run as double candidates. 
In order to evaluate whether and how this effect is contingent on legislators’ election 
mode, three groups of legislators are distinguished in Models 4 and 5, that is, 
government SMD legislators, consisting of government legislators elected in SMDs, 
government PR legislators, consisting of government legislators elected in party lists, 
and opposition legislators. Differences in election modes among opposition legislators 
are not considered, because it is mainly the two larger parties that won SMD races in the 
2013 election. In Model 5, this variable is interacted with the local vote margin. Figure 
4 visualises the conditionality of the vote margin effect on legislators’ election mode. 
As can be seen, government legislators elected in SMDs tend to speak less about 
immigration as their local electoral vulnerability increases (higher vote margins indicate 
lower electoral vulnerability). To the contrary, there is no relationship whatsoever 
between speech attention to immigration and the local vote margin for list legislators, 
regardless of whether these belong to the government or to the opposition. This 
evidence favours hypothesis 4 over hypothesis 3. 
(Figure 4 near here) 
Conclusion 
This paper was motivated by an interest in understanding speech attention to 
immigration in a party-constrained parliament at times when the issue dominates the 
political agenda. Two literatures suggest that legislators’ individual motives may be 
underlying legislators’ speech attention to immigration. On one hand, immigrant-
minority legislators may speak more about immigration than other legislators, due to 
intrinsic motives. On the other, legislators may speak more about immigration out of 
extrinsic motives to cultivate a personal vote with local constituents. However, a more 
realistic approach takes into account that PPG leaderships control speechmaking. Thus, 
the effects of variables measuring legislators’ individual motives, here their immigrant-
minority origin and personal vote-seeking incentives, should be conditional on the 
organisational capacities and gatekeeping role of PPG leaderships. Based on an STM 
analysis of more than 10,000 speeches held in the 18th Bundestag, a legislative period in 
which Germany was hit by the refugee crisis, results indicate that legislator’ speech 
attention to immigration is more strongly shaped by PPG specific factors than by their 
individual motives.  
Thus, this paper bridges and contributes to the literatures on the presence of 
immigrant-origin legislators, issue attention to immigration and parliamentary 
speechmaking. First, while a link between immigrant-origin legislators with a visible 
background and migration-specific speechmaking has been previously reported for 
Germany (Blätte and Wüst 2017), the present paper proposes to outline the limits of this 
link. Findings suggest that in the Bundestag, a prime example of a party-controlled 
parliament, the effect of visible legislators of immigrant-origin on speech attention to 
immigration is contingent on the level of labour division within PPGs. These legislators 
seem to focus on the refugee and asylum issue in their speeches due to their role as 
policy experts, serving the need for an efficient division of labour within PPGs, rather 
than out of intrinsic motives. This interpretation is also supported by the interview-
based research of Nergiz (2014, 253-263). Several interviewees explained that they took 
an expert position on immigration and integration within their parties out of career-
related motives or because they were imposed to do so, rather than out of own interest. .  
Similarly, Wüst and Saalfelds’ comparative research in Germany, France, Sweden and 
the UK suggests that immigrant-origin legislators’ behaviour is shaped by the 
parliamentary opportunity structure rather than caused by their personal ethnic origin or 
migration experiences (Wüst and Saalfeld 2010, 331). The finding of the present paper 
complements these works by suggesting that ascribed policy expertise, rather than 
intrinsic motives, shapes a concrete legislative behaviour at the heart of parliamentary 
life: legislative speechmaking.  
Second, the present study makes a contribution as the results indicate that 
legislators’ incentives to cultivate a personal vote may shape their speech attention to 
immigration in a context in which the immigration issue is highly salient. Drawing on 
the burgeoning literature on parliamentary speechmaking (Proksch and Slapin 2015; 
Bäck, Debus, and Müller 2014; Bäck and Debus 2018; Bäck and Debus 2016), it is 
shown that in such a context government legislators elected in SMDs talk less about 
immigration as their individual level of electoral vulnerability increases. Refugees and 
asylum was clearly one of the most salient issues during the 18th Bundestag term. In this 
context, the two PPGs in government (CDU/CSU and SPD) are likely to have 
incentives to circumvent criticism on the government’s immigration policy from within 
the party in order to maintain a unified party position. Therefore, it may have been a 
strategic decision to prevent legislators from talking about immigration if these had own 
personal vote-seeking incentives to disobey the party line to improve individual 
electoral prospects.  
This study calls for future research in at least two respects. First, while this 
paper had a focus on speech attention, future research may shed more light on the 
specific policy positions that legislators communicate in their speeches. These may be 
inferred directly from legislators’ speeches by the use of scaling methods of textual 
analysis (e.g. Bäck and Debus 2016, 48–74).  
Second, a natural extension would be a comparative study in order to examine 
how the moderating influence of PPG contexts can differ depending on the level of 
party control. Future research should increase variation with regard to how strongly 
PPGs control floor access and legislators’ policy specialisations. Legislative debates in 
more legislator-centred parliaments, like the UK House of Commons or the US House 
of Representatives, may provide legislators a more open stage to express their 
individual immigration-related concerns. As a corollary, while dissenting voices may 
remain widely unheard in party-centred parliaments like the Bundestag, legislator-
centred parliaments may produce more polarisation in legislative debates on 
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Table 1: FREX terms and topic labels of STM with 13 topics. 
Topic 
no. 
FREX terms Topic label 




2 bundeswehr, soldaten, soldatinnen, mali, mandat, 
afghanistan 
Defense 
3 bahn, dobrindt, fahren, link, schien, auto Transportation 
and 
Infrastructure 
4 eltern, kind, jugendlichen, kindern, kinder, jugendlich Family  
5 russland, türkei, ukrain, erdogan, saudi-arabien, 
demokrati 
Foreign affairs 








8 rent, mindestlohn, rentenversicherung, arbeitnehm, 
männern, arbeitnehmerinnen 
Social 
9 energien, energiewend, erneuerbaren, banken, 
klimaschutz, ceta 
Energy 
10 patienten, pflege, arzt, versicherten, 
pflegeversicherung, versorgung 
Health 
11 landwirtschaft, sport, digital, digitalisierung, 
ländlichen, produkt 
Development 
of rural areas 
12 daten, untersuchungsausschuss, gericht, informationen, 
täter, gesetzgeb 
Justice 





Table 3: Determinants of speech attention to refugees and asylum 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
Independent variables:      
PPG: SPD a -0.21 -0.21 -0.27   
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)   
PPG: Greens a -0.36 -0.36 -0.25   
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.25)   
PPG: The Left a -0.46 -0.45 -0.38   
 (0.28) (0.28) (0.29)   
Visible immigrant-origin 
legislator 
0.61* -0.06 1.13*** 0.53 0.58* 
 (0.25) (0.18) (0.24) (0.29) (0.28) 
Migration-related committee 0.59*** 0.56*** 0.59*** 0.65*** 0.66*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) 
Visible immigrant-origin 
legislator  
 0.77**    
   * migration-related committee  (0.28)    
Visible immigrant-origin 
legislator  
  0.25   
   * SPD   (0.46)   
Visible immigrant-origin 
legislator  
  -0.99***   
   * Greens   (0.30)   
Visible immigrant-origin 
legislator  
  -0.87*   
   * The Left   (0.39)   
Vote margin    1.71* 3.58** 
    (0.83) (1.17) 
Government PR legislator b    -0.03 0.47 
    (0.19) (0.24) 
Opposition legislator b    -0.25 0.23 
    (0.19) (0.25) 
Government PR legislator *     -3.24* 
   vote margin     (1.42) 
Opposition legislator *      -3.51** 
   vote margin     (1.33) 
      
Speech/legislator-level 
controls: 
     
Days_till_election 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Days_till_election2 -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Megaseat 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.22 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) 
Seniority 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 0.32 0.32* 0.34* 0.24 0.28 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
Election mode: SMD  -0.07 -0.06 -0.04   
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)   
East -0.08 -0.07 -0.11 -0.21 -0.22 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.23) 
      
District-level controls:      
Foreigner share in constituency    -0.72 -0.68 
    (1.30) (1.34) 
Population share older than 60     -0.77 -1.15 
   in constituency    (2.99) (2.93) 
Unemployment rate in     3.72 4.63 
   constituency    (3.34) (3.44) 
INTERCEPT -4.27*** -4.25*** -4.28*** -4.60*** -4.92*** 
 (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.90) (0.89) 
N 10379 10379 10379 9900 9900 
Log pseudolikelihood -1799.539 -1798.464 -1856.194 -1674.074 -1667.686 
AIC 3625.077 3624.929 3619.489 3378.148 3369.372 
Note: Fractional response logit regression models: Table entries show unstandardised coefficients with 
robust standard errors, clustered on legislators, in parentheses; a reference category is CDU/CSU; b 
















1 Migration-related committees are labour and social affairs; education and research; family, 
elderly and women; domestic affairs; culture and media; human rights; foreign affairs; 
European Union affairs; economic development aid; petitions. 
2 The main results remain when using OLS with clustered standard errors or a multilevel 
random intercepts model. 
                                                 
